Dissertation Project
Strategies of Extended Deterrence: Assurance, Deterrence, and Nuclear Patrons' Security Commitments to Clients
My dissertation examines two questions regarding the dynamics of extended deterrence. First, what factors determine which strategy is adopted for the individual clients’ security? I argue that the interplay of two variables— 1) the likelihood of an enemy’s quick victory in the event of war, and 2) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client— determines which strategy will be adopted by a nuclear patron among four distinct strategies: “forward nuclear deployment,” “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and “conventional defense pact.”
Second, how is each of the different strategies manifested as actual force employment? I argue that each strategy is characterized by a unique mix of conventional and nuclear assets prepositioned at particular locations. More specifically, first, “forward nuclear deployment” is embodied as the combination of on-shore tactical nuclear weapons and substantial conventional shield troops along the client's frontline. Second, “nuclear defense pact” is comprised of off-shore strategic nuclear forces coupled with token conventional forces (light presence) in the rear area of the client’s soil. Third, “forward conventional deployment” is manifested as sizable conventional frontline troops, but an absence of any prepositioned nuclear assets. Lastly, “conventional defense pact” contains neither conventional nor nuclear forward military presence.
To substantiate my argument, I collect all the historical cases of nuclear powers’ security commitments to clients. Then, I perform a congruence test using “the universe of cases” to judge whether a patron adopts a predicted strategy according to the variation in two independent variables. Subsequently, I conduct in-depth case studies employing a process-tracing method against four cases: 1) the US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe, 2) the US to South Korea, 3) the US to the Philippines, and finally 4) the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China to obtain the external validity of the argument. I employ various declassified archival materials to demonstrate the veracity of my argument.
* A more detailed abstract is available upon request.
Works in Progress
- Upgrading the Bomb: Established Nuclear Powers’ Strategic Transfer of Advanced Nuclear Technology
- Searching for Nuclear Superiority: Nuclear Offensive Capabilities and Crisis Outcomes (with Jiyoung Ko)
- Detonating the Bomb: Explaining the Pattern of Nuclear Tests (with Jiyoung Ko & Stephen Herzog)
Dataset
- Nuclear Offensive Capabilities Dataset (with Jiyoung Ko)
Strategies of Extended Deterrence: Assurance, Deterrence, and Nuclear Patrons' Security Commitments to Clients
My dissertation examines two questions regarding the dynamics of extended deterrence. First, what factors determine which strategy is adopted for the individual clients’ security? I argue that the interplay of two variables— 1) the likelihood of an enemy’s quick victory in the event of war, and 2) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client— determines which strategy will be adopted by a nuclear patron among four distinct strategies: “forward nuclear deployment,” “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and “conventional defense pact.”
Second, how is each of the different strategies manifested as actual force employment? I argue that each strategy is characterized by a unique mix of conventional and nuclear assets prepositioned at particular locations. More specifically, first, “forward nuclear deployment” is embodied as the combination of on-shore tactical nuclear weapons and substantial conventional shield troops along the client's frontline. Second, “nuclear defense pact” is comprised of off-shore strategic nuclear forces coupled with token conventional forces (light presence) in the rear area of the client’s soil. Third, “forward conventional deployment” is manifested as sizable conventional frontline troops, but an absence of any prepositioned nuclear assets. Lastly, “conventional defense pact” contains neither conventional nor nuclear forward military presence.
To substantiate my argument, I collect all the historical cases of nuclear powers’ security commitments to clients. Then, I perform a congruence test using “the universe of cases” to judge whether a patron adopts a predicted strategy according to the variation in two independent variables. Subsequently, I conduct in-depth case studies employing a process-tracing method against four cases: 1) the US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe, 2) the US to South Korea, 3) the US to the Philippines, and finally 4) the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China to obtain the external validity of the argument. I employ various declassified archival materials to demonstrate the veracity of my argument.
* A more detailed abstract is available upon request.
Works in Progress
- Upgrading the Bomb: Established Nuclear Powers’ Strategic Transfer of Advanced Nuclear Technology
- Searching for Nuclear Superiority: Nuclear Offensive Capabilities and Crisis Outcomes (with Jiyoung Ko)
- Detonating the Bomb: Explaining the Pattern of Nuclear Tests (with Jiyoung Ko & Stephen Herzog)
Dataset
- Nuclear Offensive Capabilities Dataset (with Jiyoung Ko)
* Header image: NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. (Photo from NATO website)
